Soft Misogyny:  The Subtle Perversion of Domestic Violence  Reform by Dunlap, Justine A.
DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016 12:47 PM 
 
775 
Soft Misogyny: The Subtle Perversion of Domestic 
Violence “Reform” 
Justine A. Dunlap* 
I.     INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 776 
II.   OVERVIEW OF UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES ................... 779 
III. COMMON UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES IN DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE REFORM ............................................................ 781 
A. Expanded Protection Order Coverage ....................... 781 
1. Introduction .......................................................... 781 
2. Evolution of Coverage under Protection Order 
Statutes ................................................................. 782 
3. Court Interpretations of Statutory Expansion ..... 788 
B. Domestic Violence Reform in the Criminal Justice 
System......................................................................... 792 
1. Overuse of Criminal Justice System ...................... 792 
2. Mandatory Arrest ................................................... 793 
3. Mandatory (No-Drop) Prosecution ...................... 797 
4. Battered Women’s Syndrome ............................... 800 
C. Reforms Regarding Children ...................................... 804 
1. Introduction .......................................................... 804 
2. Failure-to-Protect Charges ..................................... 805 
3. Child Custody ........................................................ 807 





* Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law.  The author thanks her 
dean for supporting the writing of this Article, her colleagues who participated in a 
works-in-progress luncheon, and in particular colleague Margaret Drew who provided 
extensive comments.  Thanks are also in order to librarians Jessica Almeida and Emma 
Wood, and library students Lindsey McKellick and Megan Beyer for quick and accurate 
footnote assistance.  Finally, this Article is dedicated to the memory of librarian 
Cathryn O’Neill who did much early work for this Article with the excellence and good 
nature with which she did everything.  Cathy, you are missed. 
DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016  12:47 PM 
776 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:775 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It’s hardly newsdomestic violence1 is universally condemned.  
Society is no longer actively colluding with batterers.  As one family 
court judge put it: society has withdrawn its consent to domestic 
violence.2  Further, efforts to combat intimate terrorism and its ill 
effects can be seen everywhere.  And these efforts have yielded results, 
as evidenced by some estimating domestic violence to be down by sixty-
four percent.3 
The progress towards stemming domestic terrorism includes 
increased services, new and expanded legislation, domestic violence 
specialists in law enforcement and child abuse agencies, increased 
funding, and societal opprobrium.  There is a Domestic Violence 
Awareness Month and a Teen Dating Violence Awareness Month;4 
buses and billboards exhort men to help stop the violence; and the 
National Football League created a domestic violence commission to 
deal with its internal and public mishandling of NFL players’ violence 
towards their intimate partners.5  In addition, the New York Times 
features botched domestic violence investigations above the fold on its 
front page,6 and a presidential proclamation recognizes the right to be 
 
 1  Domestic violence is perhaps the most common term presently used for this 
phenomenon.  Other phrases include intimate partner violence and intimate 
terrorism.  The various terms will be used interchangeably throughout.   
 2  Judge Michael J. Voris, The Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order and the Role of 
the Court, 24 AKRON L. REV. 423, 425 (1990) (“It has only been a relatively short time 
since society has withdrawn its consent to domestic violence.”).   
 3  Shannan Catalano, Intimate Partner Violence, 19932010, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1 
(2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf (“From 1994 to 2010, the 
overall rate of intimate partner violence in the United States declined by 64%, from 
9.8 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older to 3.6 per 1,000.”).  What one 
counts as intimate partner violence affects the statistics; some would suggest that this 
sixty-four percent statistic is wildly optimistic.  But, in a quote that has been attributed 
to Mark Twain, Benjamin Disraeli and others, “[t]here are . . . lies, damned lies, and 
statistics.”  See RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM 
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 333 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989). 
 4  See “CDC Features,” CDC, (last updated Feb. 3, 2016); “Domestic Violence 
Awareness Month,” NNEDV, http://nnedv.org/getinvolved/dvam.html (last visited 
Feb. 29, 2016) (noting this information under the “Get Involved” tab).   
 5  See Sam Farmer & Nathan Fenno, Roger Goodell Names Four Women to Guide NFL 
Domestic Violence Policy, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014, 9:05 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-nfl-violence-goodell-20140916-story.html.  
Further, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell was subject to an investigation of his amply 
criticized investigation and punishment of former player Ray Rice’s acts of domestic 
violence.  This latter investigation was itself a high profile and publicized investigation 
conducted by former Federal Bureau of Investigation director Robert Mueller.  See id.  
 6  See Walt Bogdanich & Glenn Silber, Two Gunshots on a Summer Night, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/two-gunshots/.  This was 
also made into a documentary: “A Death in St. Augustine.”  See id.  
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free from intimate partner abuse as a human right.7 
In addition to news features and public service campaigns, the 
acknowledged scourge of intimate terrorism is displayed in popular 
culture through social media, books, movies, and television.8  
Thankfully, some evidence of shifting attitudes is visible.  Although it 
still may be acceptable to use the term “wife beater” for those sleeveless 
T-shirts,9 asking “Have you stopped beating your wife yet?” as the classic 
unfair question has more or less fallen into disuse.10 
All of this is indeed an improvement from the time when domestic 
violence was mandated or at the very least condoned by the law11 and 
held permissible by religious teachings12a time, in short, when 
societal consent was full-throated.  The widespread efforts to declare 
domestic violence unacceptable, and to provide remedies and services 
to combat it, are clear signs of progress.  Although this progress is good 
to appreciate, roughly forty years into the work,13 it is too soon to sit 
back and bellow “Mission Accomplished!”  Work remains to be done.  
One aid in figuring out what needs to be done is to reflect on what has 
 
 7  Proclamation No. 9337, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,263 (Sept. 30, 2015), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-05/pdf/FR-2015-10-05.pdf.  
 8   See, e.g., ANNA QUINDLEN, BLACK AND BLUE: A NOVEL (1998); @Whyileft, 
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/whyileft (last visited Feb. 24, 2016); see also PAULA SHARP, 
CROWS OVER A WHEATFIELD (1996); SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY (20th Century Fox 1991).  
 9  See Elizabeth Hayt, Noticed; An Undershirt Named . . . What?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/22/style/noticed-an-undershirt-named-
what.html.  Of course, the term’s use has been challenged.  See Janet Kornblum, 
Feminists Decry Online Sale of ‘Wife Beater’ T-Shirts, USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2002, 11:42 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-04-25-ebrief.htm (“Calling a white 
ribbed sleeveless undershirt a ‘wife beater’ appears to have come from the TV show 
Cops, where a surprising number of men are arrested wearing them.”). 
 10  Former NBA Commissioner David Stern used it to call out what he believed to 
be an unfair question.  NBA’s Finest Vids, David Stern Jim Rome Radio Argument Have 
You Stopped Beating Your Wife Yet?, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73vGdCaC048; see also Transcript of McCain 
Interview, LAS VEGAS SUN (June 26, 2008, 8:10 AM), http://lasvegassun.com/blogs/ 
ralstons-flash/2008/jun/26/transcript-mccain-interview.   
 11  See Beirne Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. 241, 241–48 
(1917); see also id. at 241 (“Under the early Roman law the marital power of the 
husband was absolute, and he could chastise his wife even to the point of killing her.”) 
(footnote omitted).  
 12  See generally Rev. Dr. Marie Fortune & Rabbi Cindy Enger, Violence Against Women 
and the Role of Religion, NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
http://www.vawnet.org/applied-research-papers/print-document.php?doc_id=411 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
 13  See generally PENNSYLVANIA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
http://pcadv.org (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Coalition].  It 
is generally accepted that the first state statute authorizing protective order relief 
against domestic violence was passed in Pennsylvania in 1976. 
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already been done and how effective those efforts have been. 
This Article will take a critical look at past “reforms” and their 
results.  To that end, Part II will summarize some key areas where 
efforts at reform have yielded perverse results.  Part III will examine 
the unanticipated consequences of these reforms in more detail.  The 
Article will conclude with Part IV’s effort to understand the reasons for 
the perverse results: why the ideas, laws, and policies that are intended 
to assist victim-survivors have at times become tools to further harm 
them. 
This examination will take into account that unanticipated 
consequences in domestic violence reform can be caused by various 
factors, some of which are benign.14  It will also explore the possibility 
that the repeated occurrence of these consequences are the result of 
“soft misogyny,” a term used here to mean the bias, often implicit, that 
operates in people who are not, at core, misogynists but who 
nonetheless attribute substantial culpability to the domestic violence 
victim.15  In addition, soft misogynists use, often unawares, subtle ways 
to punish that perceived culpability.16 
This soft misogyny is reflected in the phrase offered up by New 
York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof: “misogyny without 
misogynists.”17  Akin to sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s phrase 
“racism without racists,”18 soft misogyny is behaviors and beliefs 
dismissive of and harmful to women that occur without the conscious 
knowledge of the belief-holder.  As Kristof asserts, “there are die-
hard . . . misogynists out there, but the bigger problem seems to be 
well-meaning people who believe in equal rights yet make decisions 
that inadvertently transmit . . . sexism.”19 
 
 14  See Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 
AM. SOC. REV. 894, 895 (1936) (“Furthermore, unforeseen consequences should not be 
identified with consequences that are necessarily undesirable (from the standpoint of 
the actor).  For though these results are unintended, they are not upon their 
occurrence always deemed axiologically negative.”).  
 15  “Victim” is often and appropriately perceived as a pejorative term with the word 
“survivor” sometimes used instead.  Author uses either of the two terms or a combined 
phrase interchangeably throughout the Article. 
 16  Implicit bias is well-documented.  See Project Implicit Publications, PROJECT 
IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicit.net/papers.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).  
 17  Nicholas Kristof, Straight Talk for White Men, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-straight-
talk-for-white-men.html?_r=0.  
 18  See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND 
RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2009).  
 19  See Kristof, supra, note 17.  
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II. OVERVIEW OF UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES 
Unanticipated consequences are consequences that are set in 
motion by an action that is intended to yield a particular result.20  The 
intended result may occur but so too flow unexpected and often 
undesired results.21  In other words, these consequences result from a 
good idea that has, in some way, gone bad. 
Efforts to combat intimate terrorism have led to many 
unanticipated consequences.  Too often, an idea or legal reform 
offered with the best motive of assisting victims-survivors has ended up 
harming them.22  Scholars and activists now decry the unfortunate 
consequences that battered women may face as a result of mandatory 
arrest and no-drop prosecution policies.23  Similarly, scholars lament 
the over-criminalization of domestic violence, and both the inaccuracy 
and lack of success of the battered woman’s syndrome.24  Others 
critique specialized domestic violence courts, which were once 
heralded as a panacea.25 
The author of this Article has earlier explored the harms that 
result from the misapplication of child abuse laws and practices.  
Initially, those laws and practices ignored instances of intimate partner 
violence.  The laws and practices then shifted to removing children 
 
 20  See Merton, supra note 14.  Merton writes: 
Furthermore, unforeseen consequences should not be identified 
with consequences which are necessarily undesirable (from the 
standpoint of the actor).  For though these results are 
unintended, they are not upon their occurrence always deemed 
axiologically negative . . . . The intended and anticipated 
outcomes of purposive action, however, are always, in the very 
nature of the case, relatively desirable to the actor, though they 
may seem axiologically negative to an outside observer.  
 21  Often, unanticipated consequences may be used in common parlance to refer 
especially to those consequences that are negative—perverse, even.  Merton cautions, 
however, that “[u]nforeseen consequences should not be identified with 
consequences which are necessarily undesirable (from the standpoint of the actor).  
For though these results are unintended, they are not upon their occurrence always 
deemed axiologically negative.”  Id. (emphasis removed).  
 22  See generally Justine A. Dunlap, Intimate Terrorism and Technology: There’s an App 
for That, 7 U. MASS. L. REV. 10 (2012); see also Lisa Bolotin, When Parents Fight: Alaska’s 
Presumption against Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 
264 (2008); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996); Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest 
of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1133 (1993). 
 23  See discussion infra Parts III.B.2 & 3. 
 24  See discussion infra Parts III.B.1 & 4. 
 25  See generally Kathryn Gillespie Wellman, Taking the Next Step in the Legal Response 
to Domestic Violence: The Need to Reexamine Specialized Domestic Violence Courts from a Victim 
Perspective, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 444 (2013). 
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from the survivors of abuse because of the alleged harm caused by 
exposure to intimate terrorism.26  Other critics have catalogued 
problems in the child custody system, which likewise ignored the 
occurrence of domestic violence for years before beginning to 
consider it, oft times in ways harmful to women.27 
Finally, protection order statutes were long considered to be 
needlessly restrictive in limiting the population entitled to relief.28  For 
instance, early protection order statutes often required a victim to be 
married to her abuser in order to obtain legal relief.  This narrow 
coverage excluded many who needed protection from intimate 
partner violence.  The limitations were glaring: couples living together, 
those with a child in common, ex-spouses, and same sex couples were 
all excluded. 
Accordingly, expanding the relationships covered in protection 
order statutes has been a desired good.  Over time, states changed their 
statutes to encompass unmarried couples living together and, in some 
states, those in a dating or intimate relationship.29  Many of the 
expansions have been a welcome addition and appropriately grant 
protection to those terrorized by their intimate partners. 
Unfortunately, problems occur when this expanded coverage fits 
within its large tent non-intimate relationships.30  This was the case 
when, in 2014, news headlines proclaimed: “Soccer Star Hope Solo 
Arrested on Domestic Violence Charges.”31  The victims were Solo’s 
sister and Solo’s seventeen-year-old nephew.  Should this assault have 
happened?  Of course not. Is it helpful to lump star athletes Hope Solo 
and Ray Rice together as domestic violence perpetrators?32  Again, of 
 
 26  See, e.g., Justine A. Dunlap, The Pitiless Double Abuse of Battered Mothers, 11 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 523, 525 (2003); see generally Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I 
Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 
LOY. L. REV. 565 (2004) [hereinafter Dunlap, Motherless Child].  
 27  See discussion infra Part III.C.3. 
 28  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 29  Both legislatures and courts applying statutes have toiled over definitions of 
both “dating” and “intimate.”  See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 30  See, e.g., Bonbrake v. Lee, No.43989–1–II, 2014 WL 465642 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 
4, 2014) (affirming grant of domestic violence protection order to roommates); Everitt 
v. Everitt, No. 24860, 2010 WL 816615 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2010) (affirming grant 
of domestic violence civil protection order against father protecting son); Reynolds v. 
White, No. 43989–1–II, 1999 WL 754496 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1999) (affirming 
grant of domestic violence civil protection order for daughter against father).  
 31  Sam Frizzell, Soccer Star Hope Solo Arrested on Domestic Violence Charges, TIME (June 
21, 2014), http://time.com/2908322/hope-solo-arrested/.  
 32  NFL player Ray Rice was suspended when videos of him punching his fiancé in 
an elevator were made public.  Ken Belson, A Punch Is Seen, and a Player Is Out, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/sports/football/ray-
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course not.  In short, expanding relationships that are covered by 
protection order statutes is a good thing—until it gets taken to an 
illogical conclusion, at which point it operates to diminish intimate 
partner violence. 
Progress does not occur in an unbroken plane.  Changes and 
reforms inevitably have effects not expected or unintentionally 
minimized.  Nor could it be otherwise.  The perfect is indeed the 
enemy of the good; if a perfect solution is the goal, no good solution 
will ever be advanced.  This truth notwithstanding, it remains fruitful 
to take a hard look at the unanticipated consequences that harm 
survivors of intimate partner violence.  If an understanding can be 
gained of some of the reasons that reforms intended to benefit 
survivors of intimate terrorism are transformed into tools that further 
harm them,33 then progress with fewer perverse consequences might 
be the result. 
III. COMMON UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
REFORM 
A. Expanded Protection Order Coverage 
1. Introduction 
Civil protection orders are a mainstay for domestic violence 
survivors, with every state having statutory authority for them.34  Many 
advocates against domestic violence believe that civil protection orders 
have numerous advantages over criminal remedies, for the reasons 
enumerated below.35 
First, the civil protection order process is instituted and 
controlled by the survivor.36  Second, civil orders can outlast the 
criminal process and offer greater protection to a survivor, not the least 
 
rice-video-shows-punch-and-raises-new-questions-for-nfl.html?emc=eta1.  
 33  Often their children are also harmed.  See Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 
26, at 58586. 
 34  Indeed, these orders are often viewed as the single best choice for survivors. 
 35  See Sally Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 
1508 (2008). 
 36  Even though the survivor institutes the process, there may be pressure on the 
survivor to do so.  Some service providers, including shelters, may require that a 
domestic violence survivor, in order to be eligible for services, pursue a civil protection 
order.  Similarly, child protection workers may threaten to remove the survivor’s 
children from the home unless the survivor pursues a protection order.  These 
policies, whatever the arguments in their favor, force the survivor’s hand, thus 
undercutting her autonomy.  See Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or 
Entrapment, 11 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 157, 15859 (2003).   
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of which in circumstances where the criminal charges are dismissed.  
Third, civil protection order remedies are, generally, broad.  This 
wider array of remedies, which include child custody and financial 
support, may help provide the necessary support to allow the survivor 
to escape the coercive control of the intimate terrorist.37 
An extant civil protection order can also be beneficial to the 
criminal side of the process.  Increased police attention and power 
often accompany a violation of a protection order.  For instance, some 
mandatory arrest statutes are triggered only when there has been a 
violation of a protection order.38  Mandatory arrest at this later stage 
avoids many of the pitfalls of mandatory arrest earlier in the process, 
including, one hopes, less of a likelihood of dual arrest.39 
In sum, there are multiple benefits to civil protection orders.  
Because this remedy is available in every state and has many 
advantages, it is important that it be as effective as possible.  Moreover, 
it should be used to address the problem for which it was conceived: 
intimate partner abuse. 
2. Evolution of Coverage under Protection Order Statutes 
The first wave of protection order statutes often excluded groups 
of people in need of protection.  For instance, some statutes literally 
limited relief to spouses; others that appeared at first blush to apply 
more broadly turned out to be equally as narrow.40  The 1979 
Washington Revised Code, for instance, granted the right to relief to 
cohabitants.41  But, it then unusually cabined the definition of 
cohabitant to a spouse or persons living together as husband and 
wife—either in the past or present.  The statute also included within 
its ambit persons having a child in common whether or not they were 
 
 37  See MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE 
TERRORISM, VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 16, 53–54, 75, 82 
(2008); see generally Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman 
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973 (1995); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from 
Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 
OHIO ST. L.J. 303 (2011).  Professor Jane Stoever has proposed using a “stages of 
change” model to help understand why survivors do not “just leave” at the first hint of 
intimate coercive control and terrorism.  See generally Stoever, supra.  Further, her 
application of this psychological counseling theory to domestic violence settings can 
assist both the survivor and her advocates to set in place the supports necessary to 
enable successful disentanglement from an intimate terrorist.   
 38  See, e.g., MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 2016).  
 39  See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion regarding the problems associated with 
dual arrests. 
 40  The frequently used term of the day—wife abuse—was in vogue for good 
reason. 
 41  Wash. Rev. Code § 10.99.020(2) (1979).  
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ever married or resided together.42 
Pennsylvania, often cited as the first state to legislate protection 
orders,43 threw in an additional element.  It provided protection for 
family or household members who “reside together.”44  It then defined 
family or household members as:  “spouses, persons living as spouses, 
parents and children, or other persons related by consanguinity or 
affinity.”45  Thus, Pennsylvania added non-romantic relationships into 
the pool of those entitled to relief.  Early versions of the Massachusetts 
statute also defined the statutorily protected “[f]amily or household 
member” as:  “household member, a spouse, former spouse or their 
minor children or blood relative.”46 
Today, many protection order statutes have a larger class of 
protected persons as, over time, state legislatures realized that many of 
the limitations excluded those who needed protection from intimate 
partner violence.  Common expansions include gay and lesbian 
couples, those who have a child in common, or persons in a dating 
relationship.47 
Enacting these changes has not been easy; nor has judicial 
application of the law been entirely smooth as courts struggle to 
discern legislative intent.48  The imprecision of the term “dating 
relationship” is a good example.  To provide guidance in this area, 
some statutes, for instance, specify that dating relationships exclude 
casual relationships or “ordinary fraternization.”49 
Some states have been slow to change; this is true even in states 
that might be considered progressive.50  For instance, it was not until 
2008 that New York broadened its statute to include dating 
relationships, same-sex or otherwise.51  Although advocates had sought 
for years to expand the coverage, the change had been long met with 
 
 42  § 10.99.020(1).  
 43  See generally Pennsylvania Coalition, supra note 13. 
 44  S. 1243, Gen. Assemb. 1976 Sess. (Pa. 1976).  
 45  Id. 
 46  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (1978). 
 47  Most states enacted laws covering married couples; some extended their laws to 
include opposite-sex couples living together or in a marriage-like relationship. 
 48  For a discussion on defining intimacy, see Sarah Lawson, Note, Expanding the 
Scope of Who May Petition for Domestic Violence Protective Orders in Kentucky, 102 KY. L.J. 527, 
534–35 (2013–2014).  
 49  See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(c) (West 2015).  
 50  See, e.g., Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-wives and Unequal Protection-order Coverage: 
A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 93 (2005). 
 51  See Jennifer Cranstoun et al., What’s an Intimate Relationship, Anyway?  Expanding 
Access to the New York State Family Courts for Civil Orders of Protection, 29 PACE L. REV. 455, 
455 (2009).  
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resistance that prevented its passage.  One unspoken objection 
appeared to be a concern that allowing protection against same-sex 
intimate partner violence would serve to advance the argument for gay 
marriage.52  Another concern raised by those opposing expansion was 
the burden that would be placed on the family court system.53 
a. Intimate Partner Abuse vs. Family Violence 
Expanding protection to include all survivors of intimate 
terrorism has long been called for and is warranted.54  A survivor should 
not be excluded from receiving a civil protection order because she is 
neither married to nor a de facto spouse of her abuser. 
Even some of the older statutory relationship definitions included 
non-intimate partners, such as: roommates; household members; or 
those related by consanguinity or affinity.  These broader terms may 
have found their way into statutes based upon the way in which the 
federal government focused on these issues in the 1980s.  At that time, 
there was increased concern for child abuse as well as intimate partner 
violence; often times, the two were joined under the label of family 
violence.55 
The first federal law to address domestic violence was the Family 
Violence Prevention and Service Act (FVSPA).  Predating the Violence 
Against Women Act by a decade, the FVSPA focuses on “family 
violence,” which includes “many types of family relationships.”56  It 
specifically separates domestic violence as a sub-type of family violence 
that involves intimate partners.57  The Act also deals separately with 
dating violence, which it defines as violence committed by one who is 
or was “in a social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with 
the victim.”58  It gives guidance on how to assess that relationship by 
considering “the length of the relationship, the type of relationship, 




 52  See id. at 456–57.  
 53  Id. at 456.  
 54  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 50.  
 55  See Adrienne L. Fernandes-Alcantara, Family Violence Prevention and Services Act 
(FVPSA): Background and Funding, CONG. RES. SERV. (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42838.pdf for a comprehensive review of these 
aspects of the FVSPA.  
 56  Id. at 2.  
 57  Id.  
 58  Id.  
 59  Id.  
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The FVSPA appropriately distinguishes between intimate partner 
abuse and broader family violence.  Domestic violence statutes should 
be especially targeted for a rather particular purpose—to protect 
current and former intimate partners from coercive control, and 
physical and emotional battery and abuse.  Persons who are not 
intimate partners should not be included in domestic violence 
protection order laws designed to protect those in intimate partner 
relationships.60 
There are several reasons why expanded coverage to non-
intimates is not appropriate.  First, it is unnecessary, as other legal 
protections are available—often in addition to standard criminal 
proceedings.61  Therefore, persons will still have legal recourse even if 
they do not fall within the purview of a protection order statute.62  
Second, affording relief to non-intimate partners under domestic 
violence protection order statutes creates an issue of “fit”: protection 
order remedies typically have been designed—or at least ought to have 
been designed—to address situations of intimate terrorism. 
The fit issue is important, but it has been insufficiently scrutinized 
as the statutory reach has undergone expansion.  The array of 
remedies available to victims and offenders of domestic violence are 
less effective—i.e., not a good “fit”—when applied to people who are 
not involved in an intimate partner relationship.  This forced and 
improper fit can lead to several problems. 
First, it can create remedy confusion.  It is well accepted by now 
that the classic case of domestic violence—a.k.a. intimate partner 
violence or intimate terrorism—centers on control.63  The perpetrator 
attempts to coercively control all aspects of the victim’s life.  This 
explains, among other things, the increased risk of danger to a survivor 
when she has left or is in the process of leaving.  Shucking the 
perpetrator’s bonds can result in the perpetrator increasing, through 
violent assault, attempts to control his target. 
 
 60  Not all will agree, however, that the scope of domestic violence statutes should 
be limited to intimate partners.  See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing 
Legal Protection for Battered Women, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 816–18 (1993), where the 
authors argue that expanding coverage to include “a wide range of extended family 
relationships” is an appropriate reflection of the “reality of American family life.”  
 61  For example, Maryland has a “Peace Orders” statute.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. §§ 3-150110 (West 2016).  Likewise, Massachusetts has a “Harassment 
Prevention Orders” statute that is available to anyone who proves that certain acts have 
occurred, without need for a special relationship.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258E, 
§ 1 (West 2016).  
 62  See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
 63  See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN 
PERSONAL LIFE (INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE) (2009). 
DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016  12:47 PM 
786 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:775 
 
Further, certain remedies might appear facially appropriate but 
are in fact not because of the coercive control that defines intimate 
partner abuse.  Joint counseling, for instance, is frequently harmful as 
it gives the batterer more tools with which to control the survivor.  
Likewise, anger management, a remedy still frequently ordered for 
perpetrators, has little to do with addressing coercive control.  With 
roommates, siblings, or parent/children confrontations, on the other 
hand, either of these two choices might be helpful.  In other words, 
Hope Solo might benefit from anger management; Ray Rice or Greg 
Hardy will not. 
One argument, of course, is to put all possible relationships and 
remedies in the statute and let the judge sort out what is appropriate.  
There are, however, several problems with this response.  First, 
protection order proceedings often involve pro se, or self-represented, 
litigants.  Even if a non-lawyer advocate is available to help the victim-
survivor fill out the protection order form, the risk of selecting an 
inappropriate or potentially harmful remedy is high.64  Also, judges 
often handle crowded calendars and may lack the time to scrutinize 
the remedies sought in the petition.  Further, although the judging of 
protection order proceedings has improved over the years, due largely 
to judicial training and increased public attention,65 not all judges have 
the training, time, or temperament to sort it through and get it right.66 
Second, including relationships that do not fit even a broad 
definition of intimate partner will result in a dilution of resources and 
systems capacity.  New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye 
raised this concern when the New York legislature was considering 
expanding the reach of that state’s protection order statute.67  
Although Judge Kaye supported broadening the statute to include 
dating relationships, she noted the burden that expanded coverage 
would have on the court system and urged appropriations for 
additional judges to handle the increased caseload.68  In doing so, 
Judge Kaye recognized the need for appropriate expansion, but also 
wisely raised concern about having sufficient judicial resources to 
 
 64  Many jurisdictions have trained advocates to assist petitioners in completing the 
forms necessary for seeking a protection order.  These advocates are typically not 
trained in the consequences or efficacy of certain legal remedies. 
 65  See, e.g., Jonathan Lippman, Ensuring Victim Safety and Abuser Accountability: 
Reforms and Revisions in New York Courts’ Response to Domestic Violence, 76 ALB. L. REV. 
1417, 1430 (2012–2013).  
 66  JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM 170 (1999).  
 67  See Cranstoun et al., supra note 51, at 468–69.  
 68  See id. 
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handle the expansion. 
The dilution of resources argument should not be used against 
persons who should benefit from protection order coverage.  It was so 
used in 2013, when some opponents of reauthorizing the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA) argued that the proposed expanded 
coverage to gay, lesbian, and Native American communities would 
dilute services to others already covered.69  The dilution argument, 
however, should not be used to avoid providing services to those 
subject to intimate terrorism. 
The politics of VAWA aside, it is axiomatic that having additional 
persons covered affects the resources available.  The solution is to 
exclude from protection order coverage those not involved in intimate 
relationships, rather than excluding under-served groups, such as gay, 
lesbian, and Native American communities.  Finite resources should 
be conserved for those in the greatest need.  Thanks to VAWA, 
monetary resources for things such as victims’ services, police training, 
service of protection orders, and legal services are dedicated to the 
fight against domestic violence.  Those resources, however, are far 
from infinite.  It is therefore critically important to define the problem 
carefully and funnel the resources appropriately.70 
Another concern that arises from including non-intimate 
terrorism cases in the coverage offered by civil protection laws is the 
trivialization of intimate terrorism, which may, in turn, undercut 
efforts to combat it.  Roommate spats or mother-daughter 
arguments—serious though they may be—are not of a kind with 
intimate partner domestic violence cases.  They are not fueled by 
coercive control and would generally score low on any valid lethality 
assessment.71 
 
 69  See William H. Manz, Introduction to 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW NO. 113-4, at v, v 
(William H. Manz ed., 2014).  An attempt to finally approve the VAWA reauthorization 
bill was abruptly halted when some members of Congress insisted on removing 
provisions that would provide expanded protections for gay and lesbian individuals 
who are the victims of domestic abuse.  See id.  These arguments often were nothing 
more than thinly veiled bias.  The bill was finally approved on March 7, 2013.  Id. at 
Doc. No. 1.  Interestingly, each reauthorization of VAWA, coming at approximately 
four-year intervals, has come up against significant opposition.  Is some version of soft 
misogyny at work?  
 70  See, e.g., Kate Pickert, What’s Wrong with the Violence Against Women Act?, TIME 
(Feb. 27, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/02/27/whats-wrong-with-the-violence-
against-women-act/.  
 71  See Press Release, Jeanne Geiger Crisis Center, Jeanne Geiger Crisis Center 
Receives Unprecedented Funding to Prevent Domestic Violence Homicides 
Throughout the U.S. (Mar. 18, 2013), http://jeannegeigercrisiscenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/JGCC-Receives-Unprecedented-Funding.pdf.  Even with 
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Further, the misplacing of non-intimate partner cases within the 
domestic violence system can create additional secondary trauma for 
those working with survivors.72  This limits the capacity of those working 
in the system to respond effectively and compassionately when needed.  
This lowered capacity will negatively affect survivors and may 
discourage them from further voluntary participation with the system 
or cooperating with any involuntary participation.73  In addition to 
creating challenges among first responders, having roommate fights 
adjudicated under domestic violence statutes could lead to the public 
at large trivializing the seriousness of intimate terrorism. 
3. Court Interpretations of Statutory Expansion 
College dormitory suitemates,74 brothers against sisters,75 brothers 
against brothers,76 rooming house residents,77 stepdaughters against 
stepmothers,78 unrelated adult in whose home a twenty-year-old is 
living against the twenty-year-old’s parents,79 grandmother against 
grandchild’s father (de facto son-in-law?),80 woman against ex-brother-
in-law81—these are all non-intimate relationships that state courts have 
found to fit within the class of persons entitled to seek protective order 
relief.  This is, at least in part, the result of legislative expansion of the 
relationship requirement over the past several decades.  Legislatures 
have done this to increase protection to those affected by intimate 
 
intimate partner violence, there is a necessary triaging of resources.  
 72  See Vicarious Trauma, AM. COUNSELING ASS’N, http://www.counseling.org/docs/ 
trauma-disaster/fact-sheet-9—-vicarious-trauma.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) 
(defining “vicarious trauma,” or “secondary traumatic stress,” as the trauma 
experienced by the caregivers of trauma victims).  
 73  See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but 
Divorcing the Victim, 32 NYU REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 191, 247–50 (2008).   
 74  Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001). 
 75  Olivieri v. Olivieri, 678 A.2d 393, 394 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), overruled by Custer 
v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (going further and disposing of the 
single-household requirement of Olivieri). 
 76  See Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, 660 A.2d 1267, 1268 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) 
(reversing a restraining order between two middle-aged brothers only on the grounds 
that they did not live together since reaching adulthood), abrogation recognized in M.P. 
v. K.K., No. A-2902-13T4, 2014 WL 7475213 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 2015) 
(stating that Jutchenko’s “‘rationale has been eroded’ and that a more expansive, fact-
sensitive analysis is required”). 
 77  S.P. v. Newark Police Dep’t, 52 A.3d 178, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).  
 78  Sepesi v. Gorsi, No. WD-02-028, 2003 WL 1702505, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 
31, 2003). 
 79  Rzeszutek v. Beck, 649 N.E.2d 673, 674–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).  
 80  South v. North, 698 A.2d 553, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997). 
 81  S.B. v. Z.H., No. A-2802-10T4, 2012 WL 222957, at *1, 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Jan. 26, 2012).  
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partner abuse.82  For example, a New Jersey court has said that the 
legislature intended to change of the word “cohabitant” to “household 
member” in order to “extend protection to any person who has a close 
relationship to his or her batterer.”83 
a. Household Members 
Among the current definitions of the relationship needed to 
qualify for protection order relief, the term “household members” 
(past or present) is the term most likely to create problems.  Courts, in 
their efforts to be faithful stewards of legislative intent, have wrestled 
with the definition of “household member,” and have come to a variety 
of conclusions.  Some of those conclusions, however, border on the 
absurd.84  Other times though, courts get it right, rejecting, for 
instance, the argument that residents of a group home belong to the 
class of individuals intended to be protected by domestic violence 
protection order statutes.85 
Amidst their wrestling, some courts have acknowledged the 
remedial and broad legislative intent behind domestic violence 
statutes.86  Those courts may understandably feel bound to interpret 
the statutes expansively in order to fulfill legislative intent.87  One 
court, in interpreting the term “household member” in New Jersey’s 
domestic violence protection order statute, declared that the parties 
need not reside together, but “more than a casual dating relationship” 
was required.88  Despite an expansive reading of the term “household 
 
 82  Silva v. Carmel, 7 N.E.3d 1096, 1101 (Mass. 2014). 
 83  Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 930 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis removed).  
 84  See id. at 930 n.1 (citing In re Lovell, 572 N.W.2d 44, 45 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) 
(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (regarding college roommates)).  
 85  Silva, 7 N.E.3d at 1100.  Determining who fits within the statutory definition of 
household member is challenging enough when a court is focusing on how to apply 
the statute in factual situations involving intimate partner abuse. 
 86  See, e.g., Storch v. Sauerhoff, 757 A.2d 836, 838 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
 87  See generally Hamilton, 795 A.2d 929. 
 88  Desiato v. Abbott, 617 A.2d 678, 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).  In Jutchenko 
v. Jutchencko, 660 A.2d 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1995), abrogation recognized in M.P. 
v. K.K., No. A-2902-13T4, 2014 WL 7475213 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 2015), 
the court applied a narrowed definition of “former household member.”  The court 
said: 
Therefore, we do not believe that the Legislature could have intended 
the protections of the Act to extend to conduct related to a dispute 
between two persons who have not resided together in the same 
household for twenty years, at least in the absence of any showing that 
the alleged perpetrator’s past domestic relationship with the alleged 
victim provides a special opportunity for “abusive and controlling 
behavior.”   
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member,” this interpretation is consistent with the spirit of the law.89  
At some point, however, expansive interpretations risk stretching 
definitions beyond recognition and can warp a statute’s meaning.90 
Explaining this risk, one judge dissented from a determination 
that a mother-daughter fight fell within the Michigan law for a penalty 
enhancement for domestic assault.  The judge argued that just because 
a statute targets “domestic” offenders does not mean that “the 
Legislature intended . . . to encompass all offenders who resided with 
the victim at or before the time of the assault regardless of the 
relationship between the offender and the victim.”91  Under the 
majority’s reasoning, the dissenting judge noted, “unrelated persons 
who reside together solely as college roommates could be charged with 
domestic assault . . . . [T]his would be an absurd result.”92  In light of the 
statutory purpose, the judge reasoned that the legislature intended the 
term “resident of his or her household” to have a romantic 
involvement component.93 
In Pennsylvania, the appellate courts have struggled with the 
residency requirement between adult brothers and sisters.94  In Olivieri 
v. Olivieri,95 the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the denial of a 
protection order between siblings who were in a longstanding business 
dispute, even though one sibling had threatened the other.96  In so 
doing, the court said: 
We agree with the trial court that the Protection From Abuse 
Act simply does not apply to the dispute between Maria and 
Frank Olivieri. . . . “[T]he Protection from Abuse Act is a 
vanguard measure dealing with the problems of wife and 
child abuse.  It is designed to protect against abuse . . . 
between family or household members who reside together 
[and] also between unmarried persons living together.”97 
 
Id. at 126869.  
 89  Desiato, 617 A.2d. at 680. 
 90  Coleman v. Romano, 908 A.2d 254, 258–59 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006).  In 
this case, the court found that there was jurisdiction for a protection order for a 
mother against a daughter on the grounds that they were former household members.  
New Jersey does not include affinity or consanguinity as a basis for jurisdiction.  See id.  
 91  In re Lovell, 572 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).   
 92  Id. (emphasis added).  
 93  Id. at 46–47.  
 94  See, e.g., Olivieri v. Olivieri, 678 A.2d 393, 394–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id.; Olivieri v. Olivieri, 32 Phila. Co. Rptr. 460, 462 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1995).  
 97  Olivieri, 678 A.2d at 394 (alteration in original except the first) (citation 
omitted). 
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Eleven years later, however, the same court, in Custer v. Cochran,98 
affirmed a protection from abuse order between siblings, also 
stemming from a family-owned business dispute.99  This time the court 
noted that the legislature had removed the requirement that the 
abuser reside in the same household with his or her victim.100 
b. Intimacy 
Courts have also struggled with how to define intimacy or intimate 
relationships for the purpose of finding jurisdiction in protection 
order cases.  A New York family court found that the legislature did not 
intend the term “intimate relationship” to include a child and her 
mother’s boyfriend.101  The appellate court reversed, finding that this 
“quasi-stepparent-stepchild” relationship, in which the child and the 
boyfriend were in the same home three weekends a month, was a 
“unique or special” relationship of the sort that subjects “persons to 
greater vulnerability and potential abuse.”102 
In general, both courts and legislatures have worked to ensure 
that protection order statutes are broad enough to cover all forms of 
intimate partner abuse.  Thus, expansions to unmarried couples 
accurately reflect the need to protect gay and lesbian victims of 
intimate partner abuse.  Likewise, expansions to romantic partners 
who do not live together, e.g., dating relationships, are warranted. 
But what of the over-expansive definitions—either by legislation 
or judicial interpretation—that deflect focus from the peculiar 
dynamics and dangers of intimate terrorism?  Are these examples of 
soft misogyny or of implicit bias?  While that specific causation may be 
less clear here, it is clear that these expanding definitions expose a 
misunderstanding of intimate partner violence.  And from that 
misunderstanding flows a failure to realize the harms that come from 





 98  933 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 99  Id. at 1051–52.   
 100  Id. at 1055.   
 101  Jose M. v. Angel V., 951 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (App. Div. 2012). 
 102  Id. at 199 (citation omitted).  
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B. Domestic Violence Reform in the Criminal Justice System 
1. Overuse of Criminal Justice System 
After years of having domestic violence officially ignored by state 
actors, abused women and their advocates welcomed increased 
responsiveness by law enforcement.103  Now, however, many observe 
that the response to domestic violence has been over-criminalized.104  
Some of the critique focuses on the often uneasy alliance between 
actors of the criminal justice system and domestic violence survivors.105  
Other critical assessment highlights the way in which mandatory 
policies denigrate the validity of a survivor’s choice.106 
Professor Margaret Drew suggests that the increased use of 
criminal procedures has been detrimental to the interaction between 
the civil and criminal court systems.107  First, Drew asserts that civil 
courts unduly accord leadership and authority to the criminal 
proceeding/system.108  In addition, courts and individuals often 
misapprehend or misinterpret what happens in the criminal 
prosecution, which results in diminishing the survivor’s credibility.109  
For instance, Drew notes that if a defendant is found not guilty or the 
case is dismissed for lack of prosecution, civil judges often use that 
outcome to discredit the survivor’s testimony on the civil side.110  This 
is so even though a survivor may not be timely informed of the date of 
the criminal trial.111  In sum, Drew argues, cooperation and, ultimately, 
 
 103  See generally Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic 
Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001).  
 104  See generally LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2012); Coker, supra note 103; Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007). 
 105  Gruber, supra note 104, at 797 n.241 (“This process simultaneously criminalizes 
whole populations of lower class, urban males, usually racial minorities, while 
discounting the socially destructive behavior of more powerful groups.”) (quoting 
Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in 
Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 788 (2005)). 
 106  See generally Coker, supra note 103. 
 107  E-mail from Margaret Drew, Professor, Univ. of Mass. Sch. of Law, to author 
(Jan. 27, 2015, 9:00 PM) (on file with author). 
 108  See id.  In some states, civil protection order full hearings are continued until 
the criminal matter is resolved.  That ensures, of course, that the judge will inquire as 
to the results on the criminal side.  And in states where judges have access to all 
criminal records online, the results typically are with the judge before the civil hearing 
even begins. 
 109  See id. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id.  Professor Drew describes a client whose first notice of the criminal 
proceeding was a subpoena served the night before the scheduled trial.  She did not 
attend because she could not arrange childcare on such short notice.  Her absence 
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success in the criminal justice system has become a de facto standard by 
which a survivor’s credibility is measured.112  
The criminal justice system that is appropriate for stranger 
violence—or even acquaintance violence—may not always be the 
remedy of choice between former or current intimate partners.  
Survivors may want to be free from intimate partner abuse without 
turning their batterer into a convicted criminal.  The batterer may be 
their current or ex-spouse or lover or the father of their children—in 
short, someone they once loved.  Indeed, it may be someone whom 
they still love and with whom they retain hopes for a continued 
relationship.113 
There are hard choices embedded in every domestic violence 
situation.  The experiences of the past several decades demonstrate the 
value of some solutions and the harm of others.  A criminal justice 
system one-size-fits-all response has severe limitations.114  Having a 
variety of options on the table, rather than overuse of the criminal 
justice system, may result in more and safer solutions. 
2. Mandatory Arrest 
In the early- to mid-1980s, police departments around the country 
began to take a different tack when handling domestic violence calls.  
After years of according domestic violence calls low priority and, when 
responding, trying to be a peacemaker at best and concluding that the 
woman must enjoy the battery at worst,115 police departments began 
implementing mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies.  Mandatory 
arrest policies require police to arrest alleged batterers.  Pro-arrest 
policies favor arrest as the preferred choice but do not mandate it. 
This new police approach to domestic violence arrests coincided 
roughly with two distinct events.  First, in 1984, a landmark case, which 
held a police department liable for not protecting a victim who was 
killed by her batterer, motivated other police departments to respond 
more appropriately.116  Second, that same year saw the release of a study 
 
was used against her in the civil hearing.  
 112  Id. 
 113  See Sally Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders: Can Law Help End the Abuse 
Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1499–1503 (2008). 
 114  See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: the Struggle for the Future of 
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1675 (2004).  
 115  See Joan Zorza, Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 19701990, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 4750 (1992). 
 116  See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).  Sadly, 
some thirty years later, another Connecticut town lost a similar lawsuit.  See Notice v. 
Town of Plainville, 56 Conn. L. Rptr. 640, at *1 (Super. Ct. 2013). 
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conducted in Minneapolis, Minnesota that posited beneficial effects 
from arresting a batterer at the scene.117 
The convergence of these separate events helped elevate the 
mandatory arrest movement.  States, municipalities, and police 
departments rushed to enact mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies.  
These enactments were often supported by advocates for domestic 
violence survivors.118 
Mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies also resonated for other 
reasons.  First, they fit into a trend that adhered to the premise that 
domestic violence should not be treated differently, e.g., less seriously, 
than stranger violence.  So, the theory went: if a stranger would be 
arrested, so should an intimate batterer.119  Second, these policies 
provided—in that moment at least—safety to the victim.  Third, an 
arrest, in addition to offering temporary safety, provided a window of 
time in which the victim could plan and perhaps execute an escape.120  
Finally, mandatory arrests were a way to transmit a strong new 
message—to survivor, batterer, and society at large: domestic violence 
is no longer to be tolerated, and the state will bring its power to bear 
to halt it.  In short, together the perceived benefits of mandatory arrest, 
the Minnesota mandatory arrest study, and police department 
concerns about liability created ripe conditions for mandatory arrest 
or pro-arrest policies. 
Before long, however, the downsides of these policies grew 
apparent.  It turned out that the victim’s desire to be safe was not 
necessarily matched by an equivalent desire to have the batterer 
 
 117  Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for 
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984).  
 118  This alliance between the battered women’s movement and law enforcement 
was, and is often, an uneasy one.  Sack, supra note 114.  See also Gruber, supra note 104.  
Professor Gruber notes the “political and philosophical lines” crossed in the alliance 
between feminists and law enforcement.  Id. at 747. 
 119  See Sack, supra note 114, at 1667.  The comparison of domestic violence to 
stranger violence allowed for additional strange alliances.  Treating domestic violence 
as one would treat stranger violence has roots in early federal policy regarding “family 
violence.”  The 1984 U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence, Final 
Report, located the concern for the victims of domestic assault in a conservative 
concern over crime.  Stranger arrest analogy was flawed, of course, because warrantless 
arrests—the emerging prime authority for domestic violence arrests—were no more 
allowed in stranger violence than domestic violence.  See Gruber, supra note 104, at 
794.   
 120  Sack, supra note 114, at 1671.  At that time and even, although to a lesser extent, 
now, the victim’s leaving was the only societally acceptable response.  This is illustrated 
by the outrage focused on Janay Palmer, Ray Rice’s then-fiancé, for failing to leave her 
abuser. 
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arrested.121  In the past, victim-survivors might have been outraged that 
their batterers were told to take a walk around the block, but many 
were now upset that their batterers were being arrested.122  This could 
lead to police being criticized at the scene by the very person they 
sought to protect.  Quite understandably, none of the actors in this 
new drama was happy with the newly rewritten ending.123 
In addition to general dissatisfaction at the scene, mandatory 
arrest caused at least two other negative outcomes.  First, rather 
predictably, batterers did not take getting arrested lightly.  So, while 
survivors were temporarily safe, they might have been at more of a risk 
rather quickly, i.e., the next day, when the batterer was released from 
jail.  Another unanticipated consequence of mandatory arrest was the 
dramatic increase of dual arrests at the scene.124  Police officers would 
arrive at the scene to hear conflicting stories as to who did what to 
whom.  Moreover, officers might observe wounds on both parties.125  
Therefore, they would arrest both parties, either because it was the 
easier course or because they genuinely did not know what other 
action to take. 
Inappropriate dual arrests have many negative results.  Prime 
among them is the batterers’ new and rather effective tool against their 
survivors: casting them as perpetrators.  After a dual arrest, the 
survivors are now, in the eyes of the law, wrongdoers in equal measure 
 
 121  This could be particularly true in minority communities, where interactions 
with police were already tension-fraught.  See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 
1257 (1991).  
 122  There is, of course, never a universal description of how a victim-survivor will 
respond. 
 123  It seems likely that one reason for negative police attitudes towards domestic 
violence victims flowed from this new, negative interaction between victim and officer.  
That subject will be explored further, infra Part III.B.2.  See Daniel G. Saunders, The 
Tendency to Arrest Victims of Domestic Violence: A Preliminary Analysis of Officer Characteristics, 
10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 147, 147 (1995) (“Underlying anti-victim behavior by 
the police may be particular attitudes about victims, women in general, and the 
acceptability of violence.”). 
 124  Final Report from David Hirschel et al. to U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Explaining the 
Prevalence, Context, and Consequences of Dual Arrest in Intimate Partner Cases iv–v 
(Apr. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218355.pdf [hereinafter 
Final Report].  Hirschel et al.’s report stated: 
In addition, while the overall dual arrest rates were low (1.3%), the 
existence of a mandatory arrest law significantly increased the likelihood 
of dual arrest for all three of the relationship categories (intimate 
partner, other domestic, and acquaintance) examined.  Thus, this study 
provides support for the hypothesis that mandatory arrest laws produce 
higher rates of dual arrest in a range of relationship types.  
 125  An intimate batterer—or anyone committing an assault for that matter—may 
end up with defensive wounds inflicted by the victim-survivor.  
DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016  12:47 PM 
796 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:775 
to the batterers.  The arrests of the survivors could, of course, lead to 
their prosecution.  The arrests could also lead to the entry of mutual 
civil protection orders, the violation of which could have criminal 
consequences for the survivor.126 
As the ills of dual arrests became apparent, police departments 
wisely began to implement training and policy on how to determine 
the identity of the primary aggressor.127  Officers at the scene were then 
equipped with the skills necessary to discern who was the aggressor.  If 
they chose to use those skills, they could then arrest that person, rather 
than taking the path of least resistance and arresting both. 
Moreover, as the problems with mandatory arrests emerged, one 
of the core rationales that led to their institution waned.  Attempts to 
replicate the Minnesota study that had demonstrated positive results 
from mandatory arrests failed.128  Hence, the salutary effect behind 
mandatory arrests was called into question.  The safety of the survivor 
is often cited as the most important goal in intimate partner violence 
intervention.129  It now appeared that arrest was having, at best, a mixed 
impact on survivor safety.130 
Further, the idea that crimes of domestic violence could or, 
indeed, should be treated like crimes between strangers was being 
challenged.  That intimate partner abuse is serious and can constitute 
a crime is not to be gainsaid.  The survivor and the batterer, however, 
are not strangers, and the resolution to the crime is unlikely to be the 
same as it would be for stranger violence.131 
Mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies led to unanticipated 
consequences.  Some of those consequences are understandable and, 
with hindsight, predictable.  Police went from making few arrests to 
 
 126  Mutual protection orders—often entered by consent—are not a benign way to 
resolve a disputed matter, as some victims may believe.  Operating under the notion 
that they do not want to see the batterer and certainly have no interest in committing 
physical violence, victim-survivors might think that entering consensual mutual 
protection orders get them what they need—a stay away order or other appropriate 
relief against the batterer—with no cost to themselves.  Mutual protection orders, 
however, are one way batterers use the legal system to exert control over their victims.  
Violations of protection orders are, in all jurisdictions, a separate criminal offense, in 
addition to subjecting the violator to contempt of court.  See generally Elizabeth Topiffe, 
Why Civil Protection Orders are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective 
Orders Are Not, 67 IND. L. J. 1039 (1992). 
 127  See Final Report, supra note 124, at 12.  
 128  Id. at iv–v.  
 129  See Sack, supra note 114, at 1678.  
 130  See id. at 1678–79.  
 131  Often, the victim-survivor and the batterer have children together, which 
creates a life-long tie that renders remedies available in stranger violence cases 
ineffectual for intimate terrorism. 
DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016  12:47 PM 
2016] SOFT MISOGYNY 797 
arresting both persons on the scene.  These multiple problems with 
mandatory arrest have forged a growing consensus among domestic 
violence experts against the utility of mandatory arrest, at least in its 
present form.132  It is an issue that continues to divide the community,133 
and the laws remain in force in many jurisdictions.134  Ultimately, 
women want to be safe from their coercive partners but do not wish to 
have them incarcerated. 
The tensions between police and battered women are not of 
recent making.135  Whether one is a proponent or opponent of 
mandatory arrest, the embedded soft misogyny is glaring.  Well-
meaning police officers might become flummoxed when survivor and 
batterer alike oppose arrest.  This could in turn feed into compassion 
fatigue and help fuel a belief on the part of police that survivors are 
not interested in—or worse yet, do not deserve—protection.  Officers 
frustrated with the survivor not having the “correct” response now were 
possessed of a new tool: arrest them both. 
3. Mandatory (No-Drop) Prosecution 
As policies and laws changed to compel police to arrest accused 
batterers,136 so too were efforts to mandate prosecution as well.137  Many 
jurisdictions adopted mandatory prosecution policies, sometimes 
referred to as “no-drop” policies.138  One reason behind this shift was 
 
 132  But see Sack, supra note 114, at 1690.  Sack argues that even with all of the 
problems associated with mandatory arrest and other mandated criminal justice 
policies, a return to discretionary policies would not alleviate the problems but rather 
restore the problems of the status quo ante.  
 133  See generally David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To 
What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255 
(2007); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237 (2005).   
 134  See Domestic Violence Arrest Policies, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domestic_violence1
/Resources/statutorysummarycharts/2014%20Domestic%20Violence%20Arrest%20
Policy%20Chart.authcheckdam.pdf (providing statutory summary charts, listing by 
state).  
 135  See, e.g., Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence 
Cases, 39 N.M. L. Rev. 149, 178–79 (2009).  
 136  Generally a change of law was required because the arrests were often on 
misdemeanor charges, and the common law only permitted arrests for misdemeanors 
committed in the presence of police officers.  Rarely did batterers commit their crimes 
in the presence of law enforcement.  Accordingly, criminal laws had to be changed to 
allow for arrests in these circumstances.  Sack, supra note 114, at 1669–70. 
 137  Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic 
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1857–58 (2002). 
 138  Sack, supra note 114, at 1672–73. 
DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016  12:47 PM 
798 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:775 
to prevent intimidation of the survivor.139  After a domestic violence 
arrest, prosecutors must decide whether to bring criminal charges.  In 
many domestic violence cases, the survivor is the primary witness.  As a 
consequence, a batterer often puts coercive pressure on the survivor 
to not cooperate with the prosecution.  This pressure, of course, 
includes threats of violence or other consequences as a backdrop.140 
A primary perceived benefit of no-drop policies, then, was that the 
batterer would know that the survivor had no control over “dropping 
the charges,” as, indeed, the charges could not be dropped.141  If the 
prosecutor owned the case and would go forward regardless of the 
survivor’s views, the hope was that the batterer would see the futility in 
pressuring the survivor to drop the charges.  Another important, 
though perhaps more attenuated, hope was that the batterer would 
not blame the survivor upon release and thus not administer a severe 
punishment for her failure to comply with his edict that she drop the 
charges. 
Other benefits, too, were thought to flow from no-drop 
prosecution policies.  They permit the state to demonstrate that it will 
vigorously pursue domestic violence cases through its prosecutorial 
agency.  This sends an important societal response to the question: 
“Why do we permit him to batter?”  This societal response is: “We 
don’t.  All batterers will be prosecuted always.  No exceptions.” 
Although no-drop policies have always been controversial,142 the 
criticism of them has been on the rise.  One of the significant criticisms 
of mandated prosecution is that the system now stands in the stead of 
the batterer by imposing its will on the survivor.143  The state’s stripping 
of the survivor’s autonomy can lead to dire results.  For instance, it is 
well acknowledged that it takes a victim multiple attempts to leave 
before the leaving sticks.144  The ability to leave permanently may be 
 
 139  Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 179–80 (1997). 
 140  The threat of violence may be implicit, based on prior violence or threats 
thereof.  Remember that coercive control is the goal of the batterer; it is possible that 
that control can be carried out from jail.  Id. at 179.  
 141  Sack, supra note 114, at 1673. 
 142  See, e.g., Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence 
Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 876 (1994).   
 143   See Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced to 
Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 415 
(2001).  See also Coker, supra note 103, at 813.  
 144  Stoever, supra note 37, at 33031.  Rarely does any attempt at change succeed 
at first effort.  The reality that relapse is part of recovery, for instance, is by now well-
known.  Further, leaving may not always be the action that the victim-survivor is striving 
for or that is best for her.  See Angela R. Gover et al., When Abuse Happens Again: Women’s 
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aided by services or protection offered by the state.145 
Unfortunately, however, the system’s manhandling of the survivor 
may impede her making a future successful effort to leave if that effort 
requires help from state actors.  The way in which a victim-survivor is 
treated by police and prosecutorial personnel may dictate whether she 
voluntarily seeks their help again.  If police presence on the scene is 
not a result of the survivor’s choice, e.g., a call from neighbors or 
bystanders,146 the police and prosecutorial response may influence 
whether the survivor cooperates or is hostile. 
Aside from the issue of how the survivor is treated by first 
responders and the impact that treatment has on survivors, a 
mandatory prosecution policy telegraphs to survivors that the 
prosecutor knows best.  A survivor’s valid concerns about safety, the 
batterer’s capacity to maintain employment, or the possibility of 
deportation fall on officially deaf ears in the case of no-drop policies.147  
So, always pursuing prosecution against the survivor’s wishes may put 
her, and perhaps her children, at increased risk in any number of ways. 
Further, and more controversially, a survivor may be against 
prosecution for reasons that are deemed less compelling: a survivor 
simply may want to move on or may want to keep her job, with which 
one or more court appearances may interfere.  Even in those 
circumstances, where safety may not be so obviously in play, forcing 
prosecution against a survivor’s will silences her voice and continues to 
force her into a submissive role. 
 
 
Reasons for Not Reporting New Incidents of Intimate Partner Abuse to Law Enforcement, 23 
WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 99, 114 (2013), http://mysite.du.edu/~adeprinc/ 
goverweltonetal2013.pdf (“Therefore, many abused women are making a conscious 
decision that the quality of life for themselves and their children would be negatively 
impacted by their efforts to engage the system.”).  See also Alexandra Pavlidakis, 
Mandatory Arrest: Past Its Prime, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2009) (“A woman 
may choose not [sic] leave her batterer for a number of reasons.  She may have a desire 
to keep her family intact, have a strong emotional attachment to her batterer, or be 
unable to leave for economic or financial reasons.”).  
 145  JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 54. 
 146  See, e.g., Nancy Cohen, Training Men and Women on Campus to ‘Speak Up’ to Prevent 
Rape, NPR (Apr. 30, 2014, 3:31 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/30/308058438/ 
training-men-and-women-on-campus-to-speak-up-to-prevent-rape (reporting that the 
White House recommends ways to prevent sexual assault and relationship violence on 
college campuses through, among other things, “bystander intervention”).  
 147  Some jurisdictions have “soft” no-drop policies, which are essentially a strong 
preference for proceeding with prosecution but which do permit prosecutors the 
discretion not to proceed under some circumstances.  See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to 
Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1849, 1863 (1996); Kirsch II, supra note 143, at 386.  
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An extreme example of the state actively coercing the survivor by 
means of a no-drop policy occurs when the state subpoenas an 
unwilling survivor and takes coercive measures—such as the threat or 
actuality of jail—to enforce the subpoena.148  Survivors also have been 
prosecuted for perjury for recanting the version of events they told at 
the scene.149  The solution is not to ignore perjury, to be sure; rather, 
the solution is to not put survivors in the position where their testimony 
is at odds with prior statements.150 
The soft misogyny in mandatory prosecution is obvious.  Survivors 
receive this message: Father (the state) knows best.  Women cannot be 
trusted to make decisions,151 and the system, through its prosecutors, 
must do it for them.  Further, one cannot discount that police and 
prosecutorial frustration with survivors who do not comply with 
traditional criminal justice processes may be an underlying motivation 
for some mandatory prosecution policies.  In those cases, the misogyny 
might not be so soft. 
4. Battered Women’s Syndrome 
Current legal theory regarding defenses for survivors who kill 
their abusers has evolved since the trial of Francine Hughes in 1977.152  
In a case later placed into the national spotlight by the book and 
movie, The Burning Bed, Ms. Hughes killed her ex-husband following 
twelve years of abuse.153  The case captured so much attention because 
Ms. Hughes set fire to the bed in which her husband was sleeping.154  
Her lawyer relied on a defense of temporary insanity, and Ms. Hughes 
was acquitted.155  Although it garnered significant attention, the 
 
 148  Kirsch II, supra note 143, at 402. 
 149  Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 
N.M. L. REV. 149, 153–57 (2009). 
 150  Id. at 19294.  
 151  Some suggest instituting guardianship proceedings against abused women.  
Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the Control of 
the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 609, 628–29 (2000).  
 152  Faith McNulty, Michigan Woman Acquitted in Ex-Husband’s Slaying, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 1977, at 14.  
 153  Id.  
 154  See Louise Knott Ahern, “The Burning Bed”: A Turning Point in Fight Against 
Domestic Violence, LANSING ST. J., http://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/ 
local/2014/10/27/burning-bed-domestic-violence/16224277/ (last visited Feb. 24, 
2016).  The case has had staying power.  See Susan Grigsby, ‘The Burning Bed,’ 30 Years 
Later.  And Ray Rice, Now, DAILY KOS (Sept. 14, 2014, 9:20 AM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/09/14/1328420/—The-Burning-Bed-30-years-
later-And-Ray-Rice-now#.  
 155  McNulty, supra note 152.  
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Hughes case, and others involving sleeping abusers,156 are atypical in 
that they involve women killing their abusive husbands while not 
amidst an immediate confrontation.157  In the vast majority of cases in 
which an abuse victim kills her batterer, it is during an active 
confrontation.158 
A successful self-defense claim requires both a threat of death or 
grievous bodily harm and imminence.159  These factors are likely to be 
present in the more typical case.  It is, however, in only the unusual 
cases, such as Hughes, that self-defense may not be available due to the 
perceived lack of imminent fear of death or grave bodily harm.160  The 
development of the battered women syndrome (BWS) expanded the 
possibility of this defense option for women defendants by helping to 
demonstrate imminence.161  The defense provides a mechanism for 
expert testimony that helps survivors of intimate terrorism to 
demonstrate to the jury how the danger was, in fact, imminent.162 
BWS is neither a defense nor a syndrome, notwithstanding its 
common pairing with those terms.163  It typically refers to a cluster of 
symptoms experienced by abused women, such as hyper-vigilance and 
learned helplessness.164  It can be used at trial through the admission 
of expert testimony that explains to the jury why a battered woman 
would have behaved in a particular manner.  Without the expert 
testimony, a jury may not have the information necessary to 
understand why the behavior makes sense in context of an abusive 
 
 156  See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9–10 (N.C. 1989).  
 157  See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in 
Current Reform Proposal, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 397–98 (1991).  At least seventy percent 
of women who kill their abusers do so during an active confrontation.  Id. at 398 n.69.  
 158  Id. 
 159  See Self-Defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); Self-Defense, WEST’S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2nd ed. 2008).  
 160  Katelyn E. Keegan, Note, The True Man & the Battered Woman: Prospects for Gender-
Neutral Narratives in Self-Defense Doctrines, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 267–68 (2013).  See also 
id. at 270 (“Generally, the law considers BWS as a psychological condition apart from 
other legal defenses.”).  
 161  CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE 
AND THE LAW 93 (1989) (“The ultimate question in a self-defense case is whether the 
defendant’s act was a reasonable one.  Even if she can successfully negotiate the legal 
hurdles of seriousness, imminence, retreat, and the like, she must still convince the 
jury of two things: that her belief that she was in imminent danger of death or serious 
injury was reasonable under the circumstances and that her response to that perceived 
danger was a reasonable one, not an overreaction.”).  
 162  Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence Representation, 101 KY. L.J. 483, 507 
(2013). 
 163  LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 7 (1984). 
 164  Id.  
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relationship.165 
For many years following its 1979 introduction, courts routinely 
excluded evidence of BWS.  The reasons for exclusion included the 
argument that BWS lacked scientific credibility.166  Over a series of years 
and hard-fought battles, it is now admissible in nearly all states.167  Thus, 
in theory at least, abused women have an increased chance of 
demonstrating to fact finders that the homicide of their batterer was 
justified.  Admissible evidence, however, does not make an acquittal.  
Even now, when evidence regarding BWS is admissible, its use is often 
unsuccessful.168  This lack of success captures the suspicion that often 
accompanies battered women, the legitimacy of their stories, and their 
predicament.  To augment successful outcomes for battered women, 
advocates looked for other avenues to achieve relief and mounted 
clemency or pardon campaigns on behalf of many imprisoned 
battered women.169 
Abused women have a long history of being disbelieved or 
discredited.170  First, as part of the coercive control exercised by 
abusers, abused women are told they are imagining things or making 
things up.171  Worse yet, their batterers tell them that no one will believe 
their accusations.172  Law Professor Sarah Buel, a former prosecutor 
and survivor of intimate terrorism, recounts chillingly how she stood 
in a laundromat, having escaped from her abusive husband, who found 
her and had come to claim her.173  “Call the police,” she urged those in 
the laundromat, “this man caused these bruises on my face.”  “No, 
don’t call,” he responded to those present, “she is my wife.”  No one 
 
 165  See generally Mary Helen Wimberly, Law Student Competition Submission, 
Defending Victims of Domestic Violence Who Kill Their Batterers: Using the Trial Expert to 
Change Social Norms, AM. BAR ASS’N (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/Wimberly.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 166  See David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal 
and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 633–36 (1986).  
 167  See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in 
Criminal Cases, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 83–86 (1996). 
 168  See Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of Domestic 
Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 31, 38–47 
(2009). 
 169  See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A 
Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 317–19 (2003). 
 170  See Stoever, supra note 162, at 509. 
 171  This is sometimes referred to as “gaslighting.”  What is Gaslighting?, THE NAT. 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (last updated May 29, 2014), 
http://www.thehotline.org/2014/05/what-is-gaslighting/.  
 172  See, e.g., DEFENDING OUR LIVES (Cambridge Documentary Films 1993). 
 173  Id. 
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called.174  Thus, it is no stretch to imagine how, at some point, abused 
women might begin to wonder what alternative universe they live in, 
or if what they believe to be true is not in fact true.  The process of 
being constantly told that no one will believe you inevitably takes its 
toll. 
More significantly, society has been caught up in batterers’ 
campaigns to discredit women.  Whether the reasons are a by-product 
of soft misogyny or are more pernicious, they too have taken their toll.  
The occurrence of domestic violence works its way into culture 
through news venues and popular media alike.175  While ostensibly 
condemning domestic violence, media portrayals of survivors often are 
not positive.176  And, indeed, abused women do not comply by being 
the “perfect victim.”  They come with all manner of human failings and 
do not necessarily invite sympathy.  Batterers, on the other hand, are 
often persuasive and charming.177  Their charm, after all, may be what 
initially attracted the victim. 
BWS theories helped initiate further study of battered women.  
The theories gave defense counsel and their abused clients a way to 
explain attacks on their abusers.  Eventually, however, the theories and 
methodology both came under attack.178  Further research 
demonstrated that many abused women are resistors, not helpless 
women.179  They are survivors, not victims.  Furthermore, they are 
neither mentally ill, nor deserving of a “syndrome” label. 
Moreover, the phrase “battered women syndrome” has itself been 
criticized.  First, the stereotypical characteristics it brings to mind have 
been refuted, are outdated, or are simply too limited to be accurate.180  
 
 174  Id. 
 175  See generally Jarrett Bell, Video Surfaces of Ray Rice’s Domestic Violence Incident, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 8, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/ 
ravens/2014/09/08/ray-rice-tmz-video-roger-goodell/15272689/; Eric Moskowitz, 
Jared Remy Pleads Guilty to Murder of Jennifer Martel, THE BOSTON GLOBE (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/05/27/jared-remy-due-woburn-
courtroom-today-latest-hearing-jennifer-martel-murder-case/QRd1y01jtYj 
ZFPtZccI9VN/story.html; Hilary Russ, Cape Doctor Cleared in Fatal Shooting, CAPE COD 
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2007, 2:00 AM), http://www.capecodtimes.com/article/20070818/ 
NEWS/708180334.  
 176  Sack, supra note 114, at 165859.  
 177  Lundy Bancroft, Understanding the Batterers in Custody and Visitation Disputes, 
LUNDY BANCROFT, http://www.lundybancroft.com/articles/understanding-the-
batterer-in-custody-and-visitation-disputes (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). 
 178  See Stoever, supra note 162, at 508. 
 179  See generally EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS 
SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 91, 93 (1988).  
 180  It has been urged that the term should be abandoned because it “fails to 
adequately convey the nature and breadth of scientific knowledge available about 
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Further, its wording is exclusive and would eliminate its effective use 
in gay male relationships.  Some states have recognized these 
shortcomings and have adopted new labels.181  This criticism 
notwithstanding, the phrase seems firmly entrenched in the lexicon. 
There is soft misogyny in the development, use, and misuse of the 
term “battered women’s syndrome.”  While its efforts to explain the 
effects of battering were intended to help achieve a better 
understanding of the battering phenomenon, it did so by diminishing 
women, their strength, and their resolve.  This diminishment 
dovetailed nicely with existing patriarchal views.  Moreover, there is 
not much other than misogyny—hard or soft—to explain why women 
who kill their batterers receive longer sentences than do men who kill 
intimate partners.182 
C. Reforms Regarding Children 
1. Introduction 
The effect of violence on children is well-documented.183  There 
exists an obvious risk of harm to children warriors, children otherwise 
exposed to war zones, and children living day-to-day in violent 
neighborhoods.184  What is obvious now, however, was not so apparent 
in the early days of the family law system’s approach to domestic 
violence.  For years, domestic violence survivors and their advocates 
argued unsuccessfully that domestic violence had a profound impact 
on children who lived in close proximity to it.  Finally, in the 1990s, 
courts began to officially recognize the impact of adult intimate 
 
battering and its effects.”  Carrie Hempel, Battered and Convicted: One State’s Efforts to 
Provide Effective Relief, 25 CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 24, 26 (citing U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE 
& U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NCJ 160972, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT 
RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (May 1996), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/batter.pdf).  
 181  See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2015) (referring to “intimate partner 
battering” and its effects). 
 182  See James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, Homicide Trends in the United States, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2010).  
 183  See generally Deseriee Kennedy, From Collaboration to Consolidation: Developing a 
More Expansive Model for Responding to Family Violence, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1 
(2013).  But see Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 583 (discussing how such 
documentation of harm to children can be misused). 
 184  See generally KAETHE WEINGARTEN, COMMON SHOCK: WITNESSING VIOLENCE EVERY 
DAY: HOW WE ARE HARMED, HOW WE CAN HEAL (2003).  See also Erwin Randolph 
Parson, Inner City Children of Trauma: Urban Violence Traumatic Stress Response Syndrome 
(U-VTS) and Therapists’ Responses, in COUNTERTRANSFERENCE IN THE TREATMENT OF PTSD 
151, 157 (John P. Wilson & Jacob D. Lindy eds., 1994).  
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violence on the children around it.185  About that time, sociologists 
were uncovering data about the effects of intimate abuse on 
children.186  In response, courts began considering information 
regarding domestic violence when making child custody decisions.187  
This was often as a result of legislative changes in custody laws. 
2. Failure-to-Protect Charges 
A parent has a legal obligation to protect a child from abuse.  The 
parent (or person acting in loco parentis) must take reasonable 
measures to protect the child from harm.188  The parent’s culpability 
does not occur any time there is injury to a child, as parental 
responsibility is not a strict liability obligation; rather, culpability 
attaches when the parent fails to act reasonably to protect the child from 
injury.189  A cause of action for failure-to-protect has long existed in the 
child abuse and neglect/child dependency sphere.190 
The typical failure-to-protect case targets an “observing parent” 
who watches on as another person injures a child.  The other person 
could be the other parent or an intimate partner of the observing 
parent.  In 1987, the New York City death of six-year-old Lisa Steinberg 
brought the concept of failure-to-protect into the public eye in a sad 
and sensational way.  Lisa was beaten to death by her lawyer father, Joel 
Steinberg.191  Her mother, Hedda Nussbaum, failed to protect her 
while Steinberg administered many beatings.  Both Steinberg and 
Nussbaum were arrested and charged with second-degree murder.  It 
was quickly revealed that Nussbaum had been subjected to extreme 
 
 185  Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 568–72. 
 186  BETSY MCALISTER GROVES, CHILDREN WHO SEE TOO MUCH: LESSONS FROM THE 
CHILD WITNESS TO VIOLENCE PROJECT 54 (2003) (“Services for the children of battered 
women began to grow in the early 1990s.”).  
 187  See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence 
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1062 (1991) (explaining that state 
courts and legislatures have recently begun to incorporate domestic violence into 
custody decisions); see also Lindsay Cadwallader, Mandating Batterers’ Treatment Programs 
as a Condition to Granting Custody or Visitation Rights to Batterers, 14 PROB. L.J. 1, 11 (1997) 
(“Many state legislatures have . . . reform[ed] existing custody and visitation legislation 
to include consideration of domestic violence.  Most states either require that courts 
consider domestic violence as a factor in custody decisions or create a presumption 
against awarding custody to batterers.”). 
 188  Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 581. 
 189  See id.  
 190  See Jeanne A. Fugate, Who’s Failing Whom?: A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 278 (2001) (“Since the first failure-to-protect case was tried forty 
years ago, states have codified the duty to protect.”). 
 191  The question of whether Nussbaum should have been legally excused divided 
many who work to combat domestic violence. 
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intimate terrorism at the hands of Steinberg.  Steinberg’s violence 
made Nussbaum fear for her life192 and at least partially accounted for 
Nussbaum’s failure to protect Lisa.  In exchange for agreeing to testify 
against Steinberg, criminal charges against Nussbaum were dropped.193 
In addition to the foregoing “traditional” form of a failure-to-
protect charge, where an observing parent is unwilling or unable to 
protect a child from the abuse of another, a new version of a failure-
to-protect claim has arisen based on the notion that exposure to 
domestic violence per se harms children.194 
Not long after the hard-fought recognition that witnessing 
domestic violence can harm children, child protective services 
agencies began to use allegations of this harm against abused women 
themselves.  Of particular note, the Administration for Children’s 
Services in New York City charged many battered women with failure 
to protect their children if the children had witnessed or had otherwise 
been exposed to the intimate terrorism of their mothers.195  In contrast 
to the Steinberg case, these charges were brought when the children 
were not physically harmed and even at times when the children were 
not physically present during their mothers’ abuse.196  Not only were 
charges brought, but also in nearly all circumstances, the children were 
removed from their homes—in some cases while their mothers were 
still in the hospital recovering from their wounds of domestic 
violence.197  New York City argued that a woman who was abused in 
front of her children was considered to have caused per se harm that 
renders her legally culpable. 
Assuming arguendo that children suffer harm stemming from 
their exposure to abuse,198 the person being accused of causing that 
harm was the domestic violence victim, not the perpetrator.199  In short, 
 
 192  Steinberg’s reign of terror over Nussbaum was so great that when Steinberg was 
released from jail twenty years later, she was still afraid of him.  See generally HEDDA 
NUSSBAUM, SURVIVING INTIMATE TERRORISM (2005).  
 193  See Ronald Sullivan, Steinberg Companion Willing to Testify in Girl’s Death, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 9, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/09/nyregion/steinberg-
companion-willing-to-testify-in-girl-s-death.html.  
 194  Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 197–98 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 195  See, e.g., id. at 173–75. 
 196  See, e.g., Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 611 n.300 (citing In re CA.S., 
828 A.2d 184, 191–92 (D.C. 2003)). 
 197  Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 16970. 
 198  No one doubts that exposure to adult domestic violence is harmful, but the 
nature and extent of that harm is very case specific.  See Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra 
note 26, at 570. 
 199   From time to time, the batterer would also be charged but the lasting impact 
was most often against the mother, from whose custody the children were generally 
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the mother was being held legally responsible because she did nothing 
to prevent her own abuse.  This is vastly different from the 
circumstance in which a mother fails to intervene to stop the physical 
abuse of her children.  And even in those cases, the mother’s choice 
may be a protective one, based on an experienced assessment that her 
intervention will only increase the resulting harm. 
New York City’s Administration for Children’s Services finally put 
a halt to this practice after a class action lawsuit found it to be illegal.200  
Those in child welfare vowed to be more sensitive to the plight of the 
adult victim.  Some agencies even placed domestic violence specialists 
within child protection offices.201  These more enlightened efforts seem 
to have slacked off, and still, the call to child welfare authorities may 
be the first call that the police make from the scene of an incident of 
intimate terrorism.  This bureaucratic response fails to account for the 
harm caused by removing children.202  Thus, battered women and their 
children remain subject to pitiless double abuse.203 
Of course, child protection agencies are mandated to protect 
children.  But the practice of bringing failure-to-protect charges 
against battered women often harms the children as well.204  They are 
removed from their homes, generally without explanation, and may be 
sent to live with strangers in a foster home or, worse yet, placed in a 
group home or other congregate care facility pending the location of 
a foster home.  The children may be separated from their siblings, 
switched out of their schools, and/or forced to endure any number of 
disabling consequences in addition to removal from their primary 
caregiver.  Legally, the mother and child become adversaries, each 
represented by his or her own lawyer, all in the name of child 
protection and at the battered woman’s expense.  Soft misogyny is the 
generous assessment. 
3. Child Custody 
The acknowledgement of the impact that witnessing domestic 
violence can have on a child also occurs in child custody cases.  
Obviously, custody disputes are much more common than state-
initiated failure-to-protect charges.  For many years, however, intimate 
 
removed and who had to jump through many hoops—imposed by the agency “just 
because it could,” to get the children back.  Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 216. 
 200  Justine A. Dunlap, Judging Nicholson: An Assessment of Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 
82 DENV. U. L. REV. 671, 672 (2005).  
 201  See Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 593. 
 202  See id. at 584. 
 203  Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 163. 
 204  See Dunlap, Motherless Child, supra note 26, at 585–86. 
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partner violence was not considered relevant to custody 
determinations.  Among the successes of the fathers’ rights movement 
was convincing courts and others that violence by one adult toward 
another adult in the home was immaterial to the issue of who received 
custody.205 
All states now have case law or statutory authority that permits or 
requires a judge to take into account domestic violence by one adult 
against another in the household.206  Gone are the days when a judge 
would sustain a relevance objection against a party attempting to 
introduce evidence of intimate terrorism during a custody dispute. 
As a theoretical development, it is sound law and policy for courts 
to take into account that one parent is an abuser while awarding 
custody and, generally, to hold this against the batterer when 
rendering the custodial decision.  The devil, however, is indeed in the 
details, and the ways in which these changes in custody laws play out 
varies greatly, both de jure and de facto.  Several issues are considered 
below. 
First, what must the abuse survivor show in order for intimate 
partner abuse to be taken into account during the custody proceeding?  
A common standard requires the abuse survivor to demonstrate a 
pattern of abuse or a serious incident of abuse.  Next, how does the 
abuse survivor prove this pattern or serious incident?  Ideally, the 
mother should not have to relive the abuse by having to prove it a 
second time after having first established it in a protection 
proceeding.207  In some states, however, the existence of a protection 
order is not sufficient for a judge to accord a custodial presumption to 
the person protected.208 
 
 205  See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: 
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 657, 671–75 (2003). 
 206  Cahn, supra note 187. 
 207  The system is replete with examples of how the legal system is indifferent or 
even actively hostile to the battered woman.  See Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? 
Do We Know That for Sure?; Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 
23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 21–28 (2004). 
 208  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(d) (West 2015) (codifying a 
rebuttable presumption against custody to the abuser, but also providing that:  
[f]or the purposes of this section, the issuance of an order or orders 
under chapter 209A shall not in and of itself constitute a pattern or 
serious incident of abuse; nor shall an order or orders entered ex parte 
under said chapter 209A be admissible to show whether a pattern or 
serious incident of abuse has in fact occurred; provided, however, that 
an order or orders entered ex parte under said chapter 209A may be 
admissible for other purposes as the court may determine, other than 
showing whether a pattern or serious incident of abuse has in fact 
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While it is reasonable to ensure that the evidence is accurate, it is 
just as important to be aware of the ways in which the batterer uses the 
legal system to continue his coercive control against the survivor.209  
Batterers are likely to use the court system as an extended tool in their 
efforts to continue to exert control over their victims.210  Abusers are 
twice as likely to contest custody as non-abusers.211  It is the custody 
judge’s obligation to do everything that he or she can to halt this 
continued abuse.  Judges must be educated about the misinformation 
spread about how mothers “game the system” by falsely alleging prior 
abuse in order to secure an advantage in custody cases.212  Even though 
this notion is largely untrue, the perception remains.  Sometimes those 
already thinking the worst of battered women hold this view,213 and 
sometimes those who believe themselves to be more neutrally situated 
hold it.214 
Finally, assuming that evidence demonstrating a pattern or 
serious incident of abuse is available and admissible, do judges use it 
properly?  Do they analyze this evidence and apply it appropriately?215  
If the laws on the books are not being implemented properly, then 
they are of little use.216 
 
occurred; provided further, that the underlying facts upon which an 
order or orders under said chapter 209A was based may also form the 
basis for a finding by the probate and family court that a pattern or 
serious incident of abuse has occurred). 
 209  Mary Przekop, One More Battleground: Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and the 
Batterers’ Relentless Pursuit of Their Victims Through the Courts, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 1053, 
1061 (2011). 
 210  Dana Harrington Conner, Abuse and Discretion: Evaluating Judicial Discretion in 
Custody Cases Involving Violence Against Women, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 163, 
187 n.97 (2009) (quoting Linda C. Neilson, Assessing Mutual Partner-Abuse Claims in 
Child Custody and Access Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 411, 420 (2004)). 
 211  Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of Domestic 
Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, 36 JUDGES’ J. 38, 39 (1997). 
 212  Both Massachusetts and Arizona have “Battered Mothers’ Testimony Projects” 
that have revealed some of the challenges battered mothers face in court custody 
battles.  See generally Carrie Cuthbert et al., Battered Mothers Speak Out: A Human Rights 
Report on Domestic Violence and Child Custody in the Massachusetts Family Courts, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL USA’S WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROGRAM (Nov. 2002), 
https://www.wcwonline.org/vmfiles/execsumm4.pdf; Diane Post & Ariz. Coal. 
Against Domestic Violence, Arizona Battered Mothers Testimony Project, BATTERED WOMEN, 
BATTERED CHILDREN, CUSTODY ABUSE (Jan. 19, 2010), 
http://ncmbts.blogspot.com/2010/01/arizona-battered-mothers-testimony.html.  
 213  See Meier, supra note 205, at 686.  
 214  For example, while working in a legal services office, a student of the author 
formed the belief that many of the women seeking protection orders were doing so 
solely to obtain an advantage in pending or subsequent custody litigation. 
 215  See Conner, supra note 210, at 207–08. 
 216  Id. at 200. 
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Soft misogyny runs throughout the issues of intimate partner 
abuse and child custody.  Reforms allowing the consideration of 
evidence of intimate partner abuse are surely beneficial—a well-
intended start.  But these reforms remain far from reaching their 
potential.  Judicial resistance to a fuller understanding of the dynamics 
of intimate partner abuse, and its effects on children is inexcusable. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Why does abuse of women by their intimate partners elude 
positive efforts toward eradication?  Abuse of women is indeed 
grounded in centuries of tradition—centuries in which women were 
legally irrelevant.  But for this time and place, efforts to eradicate it 
have failed.  It has been reduced, yes, but outrageous examples still 
abound. 
There is progress to be seen in many of the changes in the 
criminal law system’s arrest and prosecution laws and policies.  Many 
of these “reforms,” however, have either gone too far by exerting their 
own version of coercive control or have aggressively asserted their 
superiority as the proper recourse of choice.217 
Likewise, the changes in child custody laws, policies, and attitudes 
when intimate terrorism is involved are intended to help—and 
sometimes do help—survivors and their children.  Acknowledging the 
presence and relevance of domestic violence in a child custody case is 
a necessary start.  But inartfully or reactively drawn laws and resistance 
to or misapplication of well-crafted legislation significantly undercut 
progress, perhaps leading to further discounting of abused women’s 
narratives. 
  The efforts to help protect domestic violence victims by 
expanding the class of persons included within the scope of civil 
protection order laws are appropriate and overdue when the 
expansion covers those in intimate relationships with their abusers.  
But over-expansion to include college roommates or first cousins 
dilutes resources and—more significantly—creates a mismatch of 
remedies.  Also, developing legal theories and permitting expert 
testimony to explain how domestic violence survivors reasonably 
respond to threats that are literally incomprehensible to others are 
useful developments until they are distorted and misused against the 
victim-survivors that they are intended to aid. 
 
 217  Funding through VAWA has contributed to this overextension of the criminal 
justice system in resolving intimate partner abuse.  See Margaret E. Johnson, Changing 
Course in the Anti-domestic Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV 
145, 161 (2015). 
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How, in short, in the name of progress, have there been so many 
missteps and misfires, and so much backlash?218  One answer is 
relatively benign: unintended consequences happen.  Sometimes, they 
even happen a lot.  Survivors, legislators, judges, lawyers, and other 
advocates cannot possibly anticipate all the ways in which forward 
movement might sometimes go awry.219  The inevitability of 
unanticipated consequences, however, does not grant a free pass to 
legislators and those in search of legislative reform to proceed in haste 
without thorough consideration of the consequences of their 
actions.220  Sometimes legislation can be rushed through in an effort to 
resolve a perceived problem in the public spotlight.221  It is likely that 
less reactive and more deliberative lawmaking will make for fewer 
unanticipated consequences. 
Another path to understanding these unfortunate consequences 
relies on something deeper and more challenging: the presence of soft 
misogyny.  Of course, there are still straight-out misogynists whose 
hateful screed can easily be dismissed or laid bare—pure and simple.  
But that known hatred is easier to combat because it is obvious.222 
Misogyny without misogynists.  An implicit bias against women.  
This possibility must be considered as a way to explain why so many 
“reforms” have been turned against intimate terrorism survivors.   
New reforms will be instituted.  Will those reforms also result in 
unanticipated consequences?  Will they be tarnished by soft misogyny?  
Of course they will; that is inevitable.  The soft misogyny borne of 
implicit bias will be nigh on impossible to erase.  This is because it 
occurs without conscious awareness.  Therefore, we must first name it 
in order to have a chance at defeating it.  Once it is named, 
opportunities arise.  By naming it, we acknowledge and make real its 
 
 218  Backlash is not a new phenomenon to the battered women’s movement.  See 
Sack, supra note 114, at 1699.  
 219  After all, “[t]he road to Hell is paved with good intentions.”  HENRY G. BOHN, A 
HAND-BOOK OF PROVERBS 514 (AMS Press 1968).  
 220  See Jill Lepore, Baby Doe, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/01/baby-doe 2/1/16.  Lepore 
writes of the scandal-reform cycle that has dominated the child protection system.  The 
intimate partner abuse system has its own problematic cycle of crisis-reform.  A high-
publicity domestic violence incident often fuels cries for reform.  Some of the 
demanded reforms may be unnecessary or even harmful; but that is obvious only after 
considered reflection.  Other times, reform may be wise but should done thoughtfully, 
not reactively.  Id.  
 221  See Dunlap, supra note 22, at 22–28 (discussing GPS legislation enacted quickly 
after high-profile intimate partner murders in Kentucky and Illinois). 
 222  To say that direct misogyny is easier to combat is not to suggest that it is any less 
harmful or that it should continue; rather, it is merely a recognition of the more subtle 
challenges presented by soft misogyny. 
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presence.  By naming it and then going a step further to understand 
and counter it, we have the hope of moving toward a new 
understanding of soft misogyny’s perverse effects.  By naming it, 
perhaps we will create the willingness to listen honestly to survivors, 
rather than twist and discount their narratives so that they fit into our 
own misunderstandings.223  By naming it, perhaps we create societal 





 223  See Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers’ Testimony 
Project, Women’s Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 712 (2005).  In this 
article, Professor Goodmark examines the use of narrative in reform and discusses how 
easily narrative can be discounted.  Id. at 738–44.  See generally Jane C. Murphy, 
Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993). 
